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ABSTRACT

I

N

Misdemeanor courts have been infrequently studied, despite their central importance in law enforcement and social control. More than 9096 of all criminal cases
are heard by misdemeanor courts, thereby providing most of the general public
with its only view of the criminal process.
Our study of four misdemeanor courts--Austin, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; Mankato,
Minnesota; and Tacoma, Washington-is an attempt to compare the sentences
imposed, the processes leading to sentencing, and the influence of the local
political and economic environments surrounding the four courts. An eclectic
m.e thodological approach was utilized, including collection of data from random
samples of individual defendant case files, interviews with key court and political
actors, and surveys of local citizen attitudes about crime and punishment in the
lower courts.
Fines are the most commonly-imposed sanctions in all four courts. Two-thirds or
more of convicted defendants are required to pay some fine, ranging from a median
of $150 in Austin to $50 in Mankato. Jail is used only very occasionally, except in
Columbus where state law mandates incarceration for drunk driving. Generally,
the two most critical factors affecting both the choice and severity of sanctions
are the type of offense and the individual judge, but the relative influence of each
varies from site to site.
Reliance on fines and other forms of economic punishment (e.g., court costs) across
all the courts is by no means accidental or coincidental. Rather, the revenuegenerating potential of misdemeanor courts and the prevalent modes of punishment
appear substantially intertwined. Significant pressures for revenue-generation are
documented in three of our sites. Judges are the most frequent targets of such
pressure. Judges responded to these pressures differently in the several sites,
usually depending upon the depth of the fiscal crisis facing local government.
Judges more readily or eagerly acquiesced to pressures from county officials where
local government (as in Tacoma) was severely and visibly strapped for funds.
Substantial use of revenue-generating punishments and often minimal use of costly
rehabilitation programs do not, however, square with local community opinion.
Citizens indicated much greater preference for treatment programs, counseling,
and volunteer community work for misdemeanor defendants than what is currently
available or used by the courts. Also, disagreement about the use of jail surfaced
on a case-by-case basis. Citizens prefer to jail drunk drivers, but courts (excepting
Columbus) prefer to jail those convicted of assault or theft.
Our findings suggest a need to re-think questions about the appropriate methods of
court financing. If state financing of local courts is a trend, it is one fraught with
new problems. Both the administration of justice and the financing of services
have historically been local functions. A shift toward the state capitol would
relieve local governments not only of fiscal pressures but also of many of the
policy options associated with the administration of justice in municipal and county
courts.

PART I
THE SETTING

In this Executi '.'e Surpmary, we summarize the observations, findings and
conclusions from our study, Beyond the Courtroom:

A Comparative Analysis of

Misdemeanor Sentencing.* Broadly conceived, this study is a comparative analysis

•

of the sentencing process in· four misdemeanor courts-Columbus, Ohio; Austin,
Texas; Tacoma, Washington; and Mankato, Minnesota. We examine (1) the extent
to which these courts differ in the types and severity of the sentences imposed on
criminal defendants, and (2) the factors accounting for these differences. It is our
central hypothesis that a theory of sentencing must take into account not only
what goes on inside of these courtrooms, but also what occurs outside of them.
This requires an understanding of both the internal dynamics of courthouse justice
and external· factors beyond the courtroom which influence criminal court sentencing.
Comparative and case studies of felony court sentencing pr:actices have
become commonplace in recent years (see, e.g., Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977;
Mather, 1979; Uhlman, 1979), yet lower criminal courts remain one of the least
understood American judicial institutions (Alfini, 1980). Researchers seeking the
glamorous, controversial, and timely topic have all too often avoided America's
misdemeanor courts.

While misdemeanor courts may be neither glamorous nor

controversial, they continue to render decisions and impose sentences on a daily
basis, which can and do significantly affect the lives of citizens. In fact, the 1967
Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
estimates that more than 9096 of all criminal cases handled in this country are
adjudicated by these lower courts.

*Available, upon request, from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service
Document Loan Program, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland, 20850. See Appendix A
for an outline of the full study.
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Yet, there have been no systematic comparative studies of misdemeanor
court sentencing practices. Recent case studies have increasingly come to stress
the importance of the community environment.

In a study of the New Haven,

Connecticut lower court, for example, Feeley (1979) found that defendants
received few jail terms and small fines. By contrast, Ryan ( 1980) found jail terms
and large fines to be typical of the sentences imposed by lower courts in Columbus,
Ohio. Ryan (1980:105) suggests that these differences in sentence severity cannot
be attributed to factors internal to the court, but appear to flow from differences
in the local political culture:
Why outcomes are more punishing in Columbus than in New
Haven cannot be answered definitively. But differences in
the political culture and structure of the two communi ties • • • clearly play a key role. The political culture
of Columbus breeds a climate of severity. This is manifested in the institutional domination of the police in the
lower court, in the Columbus police department's orientation to law enforcement rather than order maintenance,
and in the community's expectations that traffic laws will
be enforced. Moreover, judges in Columbus may be more
responsive to community expectations of full enforcement
and meaningful sanctions because they are elected locally
and attached permanently to Columbus, unlike the rotating
judges who serve the New Haven lower court. More precise
linkages of the nexus between political culture and lower
court outcomes must necessarily await comparative
research.
How distinctive these local environments are, and precisely what it is about
them that accounts for such differences remain largely unanswered questions.

In

this study, we examine several elements of community env,i ronment. We look at
the ways in which our four communities vary with respect to resident attitudes
toward crime and punishment.

We also examine differences in the demographic

structure of these communities. Finally, we examine the local economic climate,
including the resources of local government, and the effect on the availability and
use of sentencing alternatives.

2

We explore these issues by utilizing a mixture of quantitative data drawn
from individual defendant case files, field interviews with court and political
personnae, and responses to a mail survey of citizens in our four sites. In Part 1,
we examine the extent to which these courts vary with respect to the types of
cases brought before them, the characteristics of case processing, and the
sanctioning alternatives available.
practices of these four courts.

Part II examines closely the sentencing

We focus on the factors affecting the types of

sentences imposed in the four courts as well as the severity of the sanctions
imposed. In Part III, we move our analysis beyond the confines of the immediate
courtroom. We survey citizen attitudes in the communities served by these courts
and examine the economic environments of the counties within which these CO!Jrts
are located.
In our concluding chapter, we attempt to integrate our analysis within the
courtroom with our view beyond the courtroom. We assess the implications of our
findings for the future of misdemeanor courts. Finally, we offer some thoughts for
future sentencing research and for questions of public policy and reforms.

The Work of the Four Courts
Jurisdiction of the courts. All of the four courts under study are lower courts
that hear--in addition to some range of minor civil cases--a variety of misdemeanor and traffic offenses. The Blue Earth County Court in Mankato, Minnesota has
original jurisdiction for misdemeanors throughout the county.

The maximum

sentence is 90 days in the county jail and/or a $500 fine. No other court in the
county hears such cases. The Franklin County Municipal Court in Columbus, Ohio
likewise has exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanors throughout the county.
Maximum sentence is one year incarceration in the county jail and/or a $1,000 fine.
The Travis County Courts-at-Law in Austin, Texas have concurrent jurisdiction

over misdemeanors throughout the county with other specialized and limited
jurisdiction courts. Maximum sentence in the Travis County Courts-at-Law is one
year incarceration and/or a $1,000 fine. Finally, Pierce County District Court No.
1 in Tacoma, Washington has jurisdiction over misdemeanors in most parts of the
county.

Maximum sentence in the Pierce County District Court is six months

incarceration and/or a $1,000 fine.

Mix of offenses. All four courts hear a substantial number of drunk driving
cases, ranging from 2596 in Mankato to 3596 in Austin.

Everywhere, judges and

attorneys consistently recognized the central place that drunk driving cases
occupy. Lesser traffic offenses comprise a large share (nearly half) of the dockets
in Mankato and Tacoma, but a much smaller share in the Columbus and Austin
courts. Theft cases represent at least 10% of the docket in all of the courts except
I

Tacoma, where some theft cases are heard in other lower courts. Assault cases
comprise a substantial share of the docket in Columbus, but not elsewhere. Eac;:h
court hears a variety of other criminal offenses, including drug possession, alcohol
violations, vandalism, prostitution, bad checks, and disorderly conduct, in proportions reflective of local enforcem·ent policies and lifestyles.

Court personnel. Three of the four courts have small benches. Three judges
sit in Blue Earth County Court in Mankato, four judges in the Travis County
Courts-at-Law in Austin, and five judges in the Pierce County District Court No. 1
in Tacoma. The Franklin County Municipal Court in Columbus, by contrast, has
thirteen judges. The prosecutor's offices for these courts vary from a large fifteen
attorney office in Columbus to a one-person office in Mankato. Austin and Tacoma
fall in between, each having about six or seven prosecuting attorneys working in
the misdemeanor area.

4

\
The structure and utilization of defense attorney services vary sharply among
the four courts. For indigent defendants, all of the courts except Austin provide
public defender representation. The defender offices range from fifteen full-time
attorneys in Columbus to three part-time attorneys in Mankato.
contrast, utilizes a system of assigned counsel.
private bars run the gamut from very

!~mall

Austin, by

The size and influence of the

in Mankato to very large in Austin. In

Mankato, there are fewer than one-hundred attorneys in practice. Only a handful
do a substantial amount of criminal work, and most of these depend upon civil
cases to make a livelihood. Austin, by contrast, has a large number of attorneys,
many of whom concentrate in the criminal area. The private bars of Columbus and
Tacoma fall in-between these two extremes of size and degree of criminal
specialization. Representation of misdemeanor defendants was nearly complete in
Columbus and Austin (90% +),, substantial in Tacoma (.53%), but only ·occasional in
Mankato (32%).
All four courts have active probation departments which, in some combination, prepare presentence reports, supervise misdemeanants, and refer defendants
in need of alcohol, drug, or other counseling to appropriate public or private
agencies.

The emphases differ, however, from community to community.

In

Austin, presentence report work has recently been cut back in misdemeanor cases
in the name of economy. In Columbus, presentence investigation is still a major
probation department activity.

The Tacoma probation department is of a much

smaller scale than Austin or Columbus, having about seven probation officers who
primarily engage in "brokering" services rather than individualized supervision (see
Grau, 1981). Finally, Mankato has the smallest probation department, with but two
full-time officers who do primarily presentence investigations.
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Defendants. Defendants in these four courts reflect a variety of citizens and
walks of life; certainly, they are a much more heterogeneous sampling than in
felony courts. Although predominantly male, defendants span the range of ages,
occupations, and life-styles, particularly in traffic offenses. Citizens arrested for
traffic offenses including drunk driving represent nearly all walks of life in the four
communities. By contrast, defendants in minor criminal offenses such as assaults,
disorderly conduct, public drunkenness, prostitution and the like represent more
selective slices of the citizenry, in terms of age, economic stability and well-being,
and lifestyle.

Methods of case disposition.

There are common as well as idiosyncratic

elements across the four courts in their methods of case disposition. Three of the
four courts-all except Tacoma-disposed of most of their misdemeanor cases by
guilty plea, ranging from 5196 in Columbus to 6996 in Mankato. Likewise, all the
courts except Tacoma reflect a low trial rate, and i!l all four courts
rate for the periods sampled does not exceed 296.

the~

trial

Dismissals, too, play .a

significant role in each of the courts, ranging from a low of 1596 in Mankato to a
high of 3896 in Columbus.
proportion

ot (usually

And bond forfeitures are used to dispose a small

minor) cases in all the courts. Thus, there are some striking

commonalities in case disposition practices across these courts.
Nevertheless, the degree of plea negotiations preceding the entry of guilty
pleas differs markedly from court to court.

Active plea negotiations, including

charge reductions, are frequent in Columbus and include defense attorney, prosecutor, and, sometimes, judge. Charge reductions are particularly common in drunk
driving cases in Columbus, where the statute provides for a mandatory three-day
jail term for defendants convicted of drunk driving (see Ryan, 1980). The presence
of defense attorneys, whether public or private, also provides an atmosphere
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conducive to plea negotiations in Columbus that contrasts with, say, Mankato.
There, many fewer defendants are represented by counsel, and local prosecutors in
Mankato have been adamant in their refusal to negotiate with unrepresented
defendants.

Tacoma is much like Columbus with

resp~ct

to frequent charge

reductions, especially in drunk driving cases. In Austin, nearly every defendant is
represented, yet few charge reductions appear in our case file data.

Our

interviews and observations suggest, however, that sentence bargaining--not charge
bargaining--is the prevalent mode of plea negotiation activity, which typically
takes place between prosecutor and defense attorney without judicial participation.

Adjudication of guilt. In all four courts, the majority of cases that proceed
beyond arraignment result in a

conviction~

But this ranges from a low of 5896 in

I

Tacoma--where defendants were often acquitted in an abbreviated bench trial
known as "reading on the record"--to a high of 8296 in Mankato, where dismissals
are relatively infrequent. Only a slightly larger percentage (61 %) were convicted
in Columbus, where dismissals are common in the numerous assault cases. Almost
three-fourths (7296) of defendants were convicted in Austin.
The conviction rates for these four courts also include bond forfeitures,
which comprised anywhere from 496 to 996 of the total dispositions.

Bond

forfeitures usually occur where the defendant fails to appear for trial or sentencing. The court, then, merely closes the case by calling for forfeiture of the
bond (Feeley, 1979:139, refers to this as "a standard device for 'Pi3:Ying fines' in
many of the nation's traffic courts"). But in Columbus, bond forfeitures also occur
where the defendant is present. Here, it is used as a means of disposing cases upon
agreement of both sides, analogous to plea bargaining (Ryan, 1980).
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Differences in the practices that take place in arraignment court impact
upon local conviction rates.

In Austin, nearly every case proceeds beyond

arraignment, due in large part to pressures fro,m a private bar actively seeking
clients.

By contrast, large numbers of defendants plead guilty to misdemeanor

offenses at arraignment in the other three courts. Estimates run upwards of 5096
in Tacoma, and as high as 75% in Mankato. Thus, it is likely that the conviction
rates for the totality of misdemeanor eases differ somewhat, though not sharply,
from our samples of post-arraignment cases in these courts.

Available sanctions. There are generally a wide range of sanctions available
to most misdemeanor courts, and these four misdemeanor courts are no exception.
Unlike felony courts which hear mostly serious cases, the comparatively minor
infractions that typically comprise the world of misdemeanor courts permit
utilization of fines, jail terms, probation, community service restitution, victim
restitution, and the imposition of court cos't s.

In addition, community treatment

programs--for alcohol or drug abuse--and safe driver programs may also be utilized
as "punishment" for the wayward.

The combinations in which sanctions and

treatment programs may be utilized provide further variety to misdemeanor court
sentencing (Ryan, 1980).
StiH, fines play a predominant role in the four courts we studied (Table 1).
Fines, either by themselves (Mankato and Tacoma) or in combination with
probation (Austin) or jail (Columbus and Austin), are the primary method of
punishment. In all four courts, approximately two-thirds or more of all convicted
defendants pay a fine of some amount. Jail is not too often utilized, particularly in
Tacoma and Mankato where traffic offenses comprise nearly one-half the docket.
Probation is extensively used in Austin, frequently used in Columbus (figures not
available), but not often used in Mankato or Tacoma.

Community service

restitution is occasionally used in Mankato and Tacoma, increasingly in Austin, but
not at all in Columbus.
8

Table 1

The Four Courts: Utilization of Sanctions

Austin
Texas
Probation

15.0%

Columbus
Ohio
NA

Mankato
Minnesota
5.6%

Tacoma
Washington
3.0%

Jail

6.7

.5. 1

10.7

4.2

Fine

6.7

.57.2

62.7

54.4

Fine & Probation

49.0

NA

4.4

4.8

Fine & Jail

22.2

29.6

2.0

3.2

4.8

2.1

Other Combinations

.4

None of above

N****

8.1 *

( 1,216)

( 1,281)

9.8**

(803)

28.3***

(565)

*Includes fines and jail terms suspended in their entirety; possibly also probation
sentences, for which data are unavailable.
**Includes fines and jail terms suspended in their entirety, as well as community
work and counseling/treatment programs.
***Includes frequently high amounts of court costs imposed in lieu of fines, as well
as community work.
****Excludes convictions by bond forfeiture, where punishment is tantamount to
a fine.
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Summary
That courts, including misdemeanor courts, vary across jurisdictions has by
now become a commonplace empirical finding in the social science and criminal
justice literatures. The four lower courts under study here, anC!f their communities,
also vary across a range of environmental and organizational dimensions. Many of
the differences in the courts are, in part, a function of differences in community
size. Mankato ancf surrounding Blue Earth County are small in population, part of
rural America. Thus, the low (serious) crime rate, substantial traffic docket, and
handful of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who do the work of the lower
court are to be expected.

Likewise, the populous, metropolitan character of

Columbus and surrounding Franklin county contributes to a large, differentiated
work force handling the more heterogeneous minor criminal docket of its lower
court.

Between these two extremes, the Tacoma and Austin courts share some

features in common such as organizational scale. But the Tacoma court is really
more like the court in Mankato and the Austin court is more like the court in
Columbus, probably because the Austin population base is as highly urban as in
Columbus, whereas the substantial rural flavor of the county surrounding the city
of Tacoma parallels Mankato.
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PART II
SENTENCING: COURTROOM INFLUENCES

The Choice of Sanctions
Misdemeanor courts impose a range of sanctions upon convicted defendants.
We brie'fly described some of the more frequent sanctions, such as fines, jail terms,
and probation, in Part I of our study.

In Part II, we analyze why one type of

sanction is imposed instead of another.

In particular, we measure quantitatively

the influence of the type of offense, the judge before whom sentencing takes place,
and a number of other case characteristics (e.g., presence of a defense attorney,
mode of disposition, number of charges) on the choice of sanction.

W'e then

examine the severity of sanctions imposed.
In exploring the basis for the choice of sanctions imposed upon convicted
defendants, we confined our multivariate analysis to the three most prevalent
types of sanctions--fine, jail, and probation--and their combinations. In all four
courts, we found that defendants are pigeon-holed according to the offense with
which they were charged. Drunk driving and traffic cases nearly always resuft in a
fine, possibly along with jail or probation.

By contrast, theft and other miscel-

laneous criminal offenses much less often result in a fine; more common is the use
of jail or probation. The decision not to use a fine in many minor criminal cases
may stem from a philosophy that such offenses are "too serious" to be treated
merely with a fine, that offenders are in need of ongoing counseling or supervision,
the practical realization that many defendants cannot afford to pay a fine, or some
combination of these.

The linking of sanctions with types of offenses is most

pronounced in Austin.
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The role of the individual judge varies much more sharply from one court to
another. In Austin, where prosecutors and defense attorneys work out most details
of sentencing, the judge appears to matter little. In Mankato, the individual judge
matters little because the small, three-judge bench has consciously striven for
internal consistency through mutual discussions.

In Tacoma, where prosecutorial

inexperience in trial courtrooms and negotiation sessions has encouraged active
judicial scrutiny of plea bargains and sentences, differences amongst the court's
judges have emerged. And in Columbus, where the court is populated by thirteen
judges, different judicial philosophies about sentencing are an acknowledged and
accepted state of affairs.*

The Severity of Sanctions
Determining the severity of a sentence becomes problematic when multiple
sanctions are imposed or in comparing one type of sanction (e.g., fine) with another
(e.g., jail). It is not readily clear, for example, whether a $300 fine or 3 days in jail
is the more severe. Nor is it clear how severe a sentence that mixes six months
probation with a $50 fine actually is.

The units of measurement are not readily

comparable, and there is no standard equation that can translate jail days into
dollars.
A number of researchers have addressed this thorny issue through some sort
of scaling technique.

The Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts (1972)

introduced a severity scale (ranging from 0 to 50), as a way of comparing sentences
across federal district courts. Subsequently, researchers adopted or modified that
scale for felony court sentencing in the states (see, e.g., Uhlman, 1979). Feeley
(1979), in his study of the New Haven lower criminal court, developed a five-point

*For a fuller discussion of the choice of sanctions, see Ragona and Ryan (1983)
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scale for sentence severity. Though suited to misdemeanor court dispositions and
less arbitrary than the Administrative Office scale, Feeley's scale nevertheless
discriminates fines only into categorie~ above and below $50.

Also, the limited,

ordinal character of his scale is not ideally suited to the regression analysis
presented (Feeley, 1979:140).
Given the limitations of J?fior research efforts, we have adopted the posture
of analyzing the severity of sanctions individually (see also Ryan, 1980), with
special attention to the widely varying amounts of fines in the courts studied. We
also examine fine levels when combined with jail terms or probation, to determine
whether the presence of additional sanctions enhances, ameliorates, or makes no
difference in the severity of fine levels. Analyses are presented for all cases as
well as for drunk driving cases separately. By focusing on drunk driving cases, we
are able to control for the courts' widely varying dockets. The result is an in-depth
look at the most prevalent, and probably the most serious, offense these four
courts handle.
Fine levels varied, in their central tendency and distributions, across the
courts. Austin exhibited the most uniformly high fines (median = $150), followed
by Columbus (median = $100). Fines in Mankato and Tacoma were typically lower,
but there was a significant percentage of very high fines in Mankato.

The

composition of the courts' dockets was one major factor accounting for these
differences.

The substantial minor traffic caseload in Mankato and Tacoma

partially accounted for the generally lower fines in these courts.
The differential use of other sanctions was also a confounding factor. Fines
in drunk driving cases in Columbus, for example, were relatively low compared
with Mankato or Tacoma, but short jail terms were much more frequently imposed
in these cases in Columbus (usually, by mandate of state law). Thus, it is difficult
to conclude which (if any) of the four courts are tougher in drunk driving cases, let
alone in the full range of cases that these courts handle.

13

Within the four courts, the sources of sanctions in fine levels paralleled those
in the choice of sanctions. The type of case was a strong predictor of fines.

In

each court, DWI cases received the highest fines, often by a wide margin; in
several courts, minor traffic cases received substantially the lowest fines.

The

individual judge, too, accounted for some differences in fine levels, notably in the
Tacoma and Columbus courts.
severity--at least, severity of

Thus, our findings with respect to sentence

fines-~are

quite similar to those regarding the choice

of sanctions.
In our description and analysis of sentencing practices inside the courtroom,
some of the variation within each of the four courts was explained by reference to
the type of offense, secondarily to the individual sentencing judge, and marginally
to an assortment of other case-related characteristics.

This is so both for the

choice of sanction and for its severity.
Variations across the four courts were much less satisfactorily explained.
The (differing) mix of each court's docket accounts for som.e of this variation, but
much remains.

Also, there are some striking similarities across the four courts,

such as the prevalent use of fines, not readily accounted for by the types of factors
w~

initially examined.

In order to reach a comparative-based explanation, we

moved beyond the courtroom to the communities -in which these courts are located.
More particularly, we turned to the political and economic environments within
which the lower courts sentence their defendants. This neglected arena of inquiry
provides, we think, the basis for better understanding of why criminal courts do
what they do.

14

PART III
SENTENCING: COMMUNITY INFLUENCES

In Part III of our study, we examined influences outside the courtroom to
determine their effect on sentencing practices in each of the four courts.

In

particular, we surveyed citizen attitudes in the communities served by these courts
and examined the varying economic environments of the counties within which
these courts are located.

Community Attitudes Toward Crime and Punishment
In examining community attitudes toward crime and justice, we sought to
discover the amount and types of congruence between local attitudes toward
punishment and lower court sentences in these communi ties.

Though surveys of

public opinion on crime and punishment have been undertaken (see, e.g., Blumstein
and Cohen, 1980; Thomas et al., 1976; Grindstaff, 1974; Rossi et al., 1974; Gibbons,
196 9), this is one of the first instances where attitudes and court sentences from
the

~local

jurisdictions have been compared.

We tapped community attitudes through a questionnaire mailed to a random
sample of households in the four counties whose courts we have previously
described.

The response rate to the survey was remarkable by almost any

standards.

More than 50% of the households in three of the four communities

responded--65% in Mankato, 55% in Columbus, 51% in Austin. Only in Tacoma did
the response fall below half, 43%. These response rates compare well with surveys
of judges and other public figures reported in the literature (see, e.g., Ryan et al.,
1980).

Equally important, the respondents to our survey appear to be quite

representative of their communities, based upon available Census Data.
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Relatively little congruence between citizen attitudes and court sentences
emerged from our data analysis. In absolute terms, the percentage of citizens who
wou.ld fine, jail, or impose other sanctions upon convicted defendants in drunk
driving, shoplifting, arid assault cases varies sharply from the sentences that the
local court actually imposed.
The strongest congruences between what courts do and what citizens think

they should do occurs in the minor traffic offense area-speeding. 80% or more of
all speeders are fined in each of the courts, and roughly 80% or more of citizens in
each of the communi ties think speeders should be fined.

Equally compelling,

neither courts nor citizens believe in the frequent application of other sanctions in
speeding cases.

Strongest citizen support emerges for driver improvement

programs, and it is these that are typically most likely to accompany fines in the
few instances where courts employ more than one sanction.
Significant disparities occur between courts and citizens in drunk driving
cases. In general terms, citizens in our four communities would "throw the book"
at drunk drivers, imposing upon them an array of sanctions. Courts, by contrast,
are more selective in the actual use of sanctions. The sharpest differences appear
in the utilization of fines and' jail terms. In all four courts, nearly every defendant
receives some fine, but only about two-thirds or slightly fewer citizens would fine
defendants.
instead,

A significant minority of the populace in each community would,

suspen~

the license of convicted drunk drivers and send them to treatment

programs. Correlatively, though, a significant minority--also about one-third--of
each community would send drunk drivers to jail. Yet two of the courts--Mankato
and Tacoma--rarely jail drunk drivers, and Austin does so only slightly more often.
Only in Columbus does the percentage of defendants jailed for drunk driving
roughly match the percentage of citizens who would send drunk drivers to jail.
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Sharp differences also occur in shoplifting cases. In the most general terms,
courts impose predominantly punitive sanctions-fine and jail--whereas the citizenry favors much greater use of restitution to the victim (store), counseling for
defendants, and community service work. The latter is used by the Mankato and
Tacoma courts in theft cases but .flOt nearly with the frequency the citizenry
favors, and community service is not at all utilized in theft cases in Columbus or
Austin.

Likewise, there is strong citizen support for counseling but little use by

the courts.
Disparities in assault cases generally parallel those in shoplifting cases.
Except in Mankato,

th~

courts fine defendants much more frequently than would

the citizenry. Likewise, the courts generally jail defendants in assault cases more
often than citizens would.

Indeed, in one of the few statistically significant

differences among community attitudes toward punishment, citizens in Mankato
and Tacoma would send assault defendants to jail less often than citizens in
Columbus and Austin.

Yet it is precisely in Mankato and Tacoma where assault

defendants are most likely to go to jail.
In a more comparative vein, there is some evidence for a relationship
between community attitudes and court sanctions.

The most punitive citizenry

appears to be Columbus, favoring more jail, less treatment programs, and less
community service work. Likewise, the court most likely to send a defendant to
jail is the Columbus one.

By contrast, Mankato citizens seem to be the least

supportive of jail and more supportive of treatment programs and community work.
Similarly, the Mankato court employs treatment programs more often and jail less
often than the other courts. Nevertheless, the number of cases in this comparison
is small (n

= 4),

the differences are generally not large, and information about the

use of sanctions (particularly, treatment programs) by courts is sometimes sketchy.
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Furthermore, the aggregate preferences of citizens regarding the use of such
sanctions as jail mask differences on a case-by-case basis that are not consistent
with court use of these sanctions.
In sum, there are both similarities and differences in court sentencing
practices across the four courts that cannot be explained by the highly similar
moral climates of the four communities. With the few exceptions already noted,
citizens in Austin, Columbus, Mankato, and Tacoma generally feel much the same
about which types of sanctions should be used in punishing misdemeanor defendants. But lower courts appear to be responsive to factors other than public opinion.
One such factor, we found, is the local economic environment.

The State of the Fiscal Economy
Criminal justice agencies rely on public funds to support their daily activities.

In most states, this means primarily local (county) funding (Baar, 197.5).

Thus, the availability of county funds, or more broadly, the strength of the local
economic environment, becomes a potentially critical factor affecting local courts.
We explore this nexus for Pierce county (Tacoma), Travis county (Austin), and Blue
Earth county (Mankato),* in general terms and specifically with respect to
sentencing.
A severe fiscal crisis in the Pierce County government and the resultant
pressures upon the court to generate revenue have significantly altered the
sentencing practices of the Tacoma court. Caught between the simultaneous and
conflicting demands of the state and county to raise revenues, the judiciary has
altered the use of fines imposed. In an attempt to keep court-generated revenues
within the county, fines have increasingly come to be replaced by "court costs"

*Limited budgetary resources precluded the study of Columbus, Ohio's local economic
environment.
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which, unlike fines, remain entirely within the coffers of county government.
These efforts, though, have served to further exacerbate the fiscal problems of the
state. In so doing, they have indirectly contributed to deteriorating conditions
within the county jail, for overcrowding in state correctional facilities has spHled
over into aH local county jails.

As a result, judges have begun to search for

alternatives to jail, but the viability of alternatives is, in turn, reduced by county
efforts to save money through personnel cutbacks, such as in probation.
Fiscal constraints within Travis County have contributed to the problems
faced by the county jail in Austin. Insufficient revenues to upgrade the jail have
permitted serious deficiencies within the facility, thereby reducing the likelihood
of jail sentence recommendations by a prosecutor's office which dominates the
sentencing decision in Austin.
Travis County.

Fiscal constraints have also altered probation in

The more costly "team concept" has given way to the more

efficient--but perhaps less effective--individual approach to probation.
Mankato courts have been the least affected by economic pressures.

Blue

Earth County has yet to feel the pinch of increasing fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, the state of Minnesota--like most states--is feeling the pinch, and so
strategies for coping with such possibilities are beginning to emerge. As yet, such
constraints have not significantly affected sentencing in Mankato. But the future
of community service, probation, and some treatment programs are by no means
secure in the Mankato court.

Jails*
Conditions within Travis County Jail in Austin were deplorable by almost any
standard.

A federal lawsuit was pending against the county because of these

conditions, and a federal court had ruled in 197'4 that conditions within the jail

*Limited budgetary resources precluded the study of Columbus, Ohio's local jails.
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violated inmates' rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.

Conditions within the jail had not improved

markedly between 197 5 and 1982.

At the time of our interviews, the County

Commissioners were unavailable, but could be found in meetings regarding the
continuing pressure by the federal courts to bring the Travis County Jail in line
with constitutional rights.
"

The Pierce County Jail in Tacoma also faced problems. Though no law suits
were pending agai_n st the county jail, overcrowded facilities resulted in inmates
being released before the completion of their sentences.

Some defendants

sentenced to county jail were never admitted, due to overcrowding.
By contrast, Blue Earth County Jail in Mankato was recognized as the finest
facility in southern Minnesota. Overcrowding was no problem. Indeed, the facility
was being used to house defendants sentenced to jail by courts in adjacent counties.
Conditions within the Austin and Tacoma County jails had significant effects
on court practices.
populations down.

Judges in both communities felt

pres~ured

to keep the jail

In Austin, these pressures resulted in changes in custody and

sentencing practices. Austin _defendants who might otherwise have been detained
were being released on personal recognizance.

And sentence recommendations

made by the prosecutor's office were being modified in light of the jail situation.
The impact of the changes in recommendations assumed all the more meaning in
light of the Aus.tin judiciary's willingness to "rubber stamp" such recommendations.
Tacoma judges were especially outspoken in their frustration with the
conditions of the county jail. Judges felt their sentences were being overruled by
executive actions, and they felt that their own credibility was being undermined in
the eyes of the populace. Judges often modified jail sentences after some time had
been served.

Alternatives to incarceration were actively sought.

judge noted, "rm looking for reasons not to send somebody to jail."

20

One Tacoma

PART IV
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

We have presented a multi-faceted view of the sentencing process in four
lower criminal courts, stretching ,from the shores of Tacoma, Washington to the
streets of Columbus, Ohio.

The question of why one defendant is sentenced in a

particular way and another defendant differently is tackled first.

We analyze

sentencing practices within four courts, emphasizing the role of legal and, to a
lesser extent, extra-legal factors. Then, we address why defendants as a whole are
sentenced in particular ways in one community but differently in others. This leads
to a structural, or macro-level, perspective, in which we examine the influence of
the political and economic environments surrounding these four courts. This dual
approach to studying sentencing yields a more satisfactory response to questions of
both differences and similarities across the four lower courts.

Summary and Conclusions
Despite our ability to explain some, and occasionally much, of the variation
in sentencing practices within these four courts, we share with Feeley (1979) some
uneasiness about the completeness of a quantitative analysis of individual defendant sentences. Feeley's response was to utilize a qualitative approach to describe
the .erocess by which defendants came to be adjudicated and sentenced within the
New Haven court.

Our response, likewise, was to adopt primarily a qualitative

approach but to direct our efforts beyond. the courtroom, to the larger community
in which these courts function. There is ample evidence for the hypothesis that the
community influences courts and the administration of justice (see, e.g., Baar,
1975; Levin, 1977; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Kritzer, 1979; Ryan et al., 1980),

though little systematic testing has been done to date.
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Finding little evidence for the influence of community attitudes about crime
on lower court sentencing, we turned to the economic environment of the
communities.

Here, we struck the proverbial "pay dirt." Though our analysis is

necessarily preliminary because it rests on interview data, not on actual numbers
about the fiscal or budgetary picture, we believe the convergence of perceptions
among a variety of court, court-related, and political actors lends credence to our
interpretation~

and conclusions.

Quantitative analyses revealed heavy reliance on the use of fines in all four
courts.

We believe this is no accident or coincidence.

Nor do we see this

phenomenon to be the result either of lofty penological considerations or a
response to community values. Instead, we interpret the prevalent use of fines to
reflect "economic realities"--that is, taking advantage of the opportunity to raise
revenue for local (county) government. Fines can be seen as another local tax--in
this instance, on minor illegal behavior.

Local county boards impose this tax,

which is politically acceptable to the populace because the amount is relatively
small, the principle is "user-based," and the users constitute a small and unpowerful portion of the total population.
·Revenue generation takes place within quite different political and economic
contexts, however. For one thing, the locales themselves vary in how dependent
they are--or choose to be--on court-imposed fines, fees, and costs.

Economic

conditions, themselves, may not be comparable. Tacoma's county government, for
example, was mired in a financial crisis far deeper than Austin or Mankato's.
Correspondingly, expectations about the courts being "self-sustaining" in Tacoma
contrasted with more modest visions of revenue-capability in Austin and Mankato.
The source of pressures, however direct or subtle, also varied. The county board
provided the (heavy) pressure in Tacoma and the (very mild) pressure in Mankato.
But in Austin pressure came from the probation department, because the judicially-
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imposed monthly assessment of $15 accompanying probation went directly to the
probation department rather than to the county general fund.
Judicial responses to these pressures also differed from locale to locale.
Judges in Tacoma acquiesced; indeed, they actively shuffled fines and court costs
so as to improve the economic position of the county vis-a-vis the state. Austin
judges, too, acquiesced to these pressures, albeit somewhat more reluctantly and
less consistently. They did, for example, waive the probation fee on occasion for
poor or nearly-indigent defendants, much to the chagrin of the probation department.

By contrast, Mankato judges consistently resisted pressures to raise

additional revenue. They

rejec~ed

the suggestion of adopting court costs (Mankato

currently imposes no court costs other than for partial reimbursement for use of
the public defender's office).

Perhaps because of this firm judicial opposition,

Mankato was the only site where we found evidence that the targets of pressure
extended beyond the court. There, some informants thought the police might be
under some pressure to raise more revenue for the county, citing as evidence
periodic blitzes of drunk driving arrests and traffic violations.
Counties were not the only level of government strapped for funds. States,
too, were far from fiscal security, further jeopardizing the economic viability of
their local governments.

Interestingly, states sometimes used local courts as

sources of generating revenue for other, criminal justice-related programs.

The

state of Washington was particularly active in this regard. Assessments in five and
ten dollar amounts were piled on top of defendant fines to help pay for statewide
programs for traffic safety education and police training, among other things. In
Texas, state-imposed assessments on fines in the local courts helped to raise the
money to pay for state matches to federal grants awarded to local courts.

In

Minnesota, the legislature was debating, but had not yet passed, a measure similar
to Washington-style
assessments for police training and victim assistance pro\
grams.
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The other side of revenue generation is cost control. Reducing expenditures
has become a common theme at aU levels of government-federal, state and local-and throughout the private economy.

Courts, too, have not escaped from cost-

control techniques and budgetary cutbacks. Probation departments, in particular,
have been the targets of personnel cutbacks. Austin and Tacoma have been hit
particularly severely; in Austin, more than two dozen probation officers were laid
off within an eighteen month period.
The withdrawal of federal programs and funds has also affected these courts.
The demise of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the
emaciation of the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) have been
largely responsible for the diminution of federal government contributions.

The

Austin court was especially reliant on LEAA in a number of programmatic areas,
including court administration, forensic services, and probation. One result was an
elimination of the professionat'-level court administration position in favor of an
upgrading of lower level, clerical personnel. For probation, the result was severe
cutbacks in staff along with the elimination of the Austin court's innovative "team"
concept. The Mankato and Tacoma courts have utilized CETA personnel to varying
degrees.

Their elimination in Mankato could threaten the court's currently-

extensive use of community service work, because in the past CET A personnel have
administered that program.

Perhaps surprisingly, Tacoma seems to have antici-

pated the decline of CET A by developing strategies to incorporate either the tasks
they performed or the personnel themselves into the mainstream of the bureaucracy.

Still, the severe pressures on local government in Tacoma could lead to

further cutbacks in the Tacoma court support staff.
Several implications for . misdemeanor court sentencing and the administration of justice appear on the horizon, given the "economic realities" of these
three communities. First, the treatment-rehabilitation ethic--so widely prevalent
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in ·American penology--appear:s to be in jeopardy in the nation's lower criminal
courts. At a time when money is tight, priori ties are being re-examined. Policymakers see little in the way of political constituencies behind rehabilitation
programs, though the public itself is not un.i formly skeptical (based upon our survey
responses). Furthermore, criminal jus.tice research has found

les~

than resounding

evidence of the success of rehabilitative approaches (see, e.g., Martinson, 1975).
Probation, in particular, appears on the verge of being dismantled in mis,d emeanor
courts, and community service restitution may be crushed in its infancy. General
treatment programs, such as for drug or alcohol-related offenses, may survive only
'

if user costs are greatly increased or if existing local welfare and human service
bureaucracies absorb criminal justice system defendants.
Secondly, the use of ja_il for convicted misdemeanants may become a luxury
of the past.

Except where state law mandates short-term incarceration (as

increasingly appears to be the case with drunk drivers), the discretionary use of jail
may be rare indeed. If our locales are at all representative, many local jails are
teeming with felony defendants who either have been convicted and sentenced or
are in custody awaiting trial. With serious crime on the increase and measures to
limit bail opportunities widespread in the states, we can only expect the pressures
from felony defendants on county jails to grow worse. In hard ecomonic times, and
especially in places whose jails are already overcrowded, misdemeanor defendants
are likely to be the beneficiaries. If defendants cannot be jailed and treatment
programs diminish, fines will become the staple of punishment in the lbwer courts
to a degree even greater than the current situation. This may not necessarily lead
to much more revenue, however. Rather, difficulties in collection from poor and

--

transient defendants may result (Hillsman et al., 1982).
'

Criminal court proceedings have often been likened to morality plays
(Erikson, 1966; Bennett and Feldman, 1981).
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But we have found that the

proceedings are "played" before a backdrop of politics and economics, in which
judicial discretion in sentencing will be increasingly curtailed.

Appellate court

decisions, legislative actions, and scarce budgetary resources are becoming major
contributing factors to this process.

Federal court decisions limit the use of

overcrowded or unsafe jails, incarceration of defendants unable to pay fines, and
incarceration of defendants without counsel.

At the state level, legislators are

becoming increasingly restive over the public outrage at drunk driving. The result
probably will be tougher statutes that (like Ohio's) mandate incarceration-even if
for a short period--of defendants convicted of drunk driving.

Though charge

reductions will always be potentially available to circumscribe legislative intent,
this too may be more difficult to accompllsh under the glare of increased visibility.
Finally, scarce budgetary resources at the federal, state, and local levels are likely
to impair the use of treatment programs and other costly-to-administer sentencing
options such as community work. In short, judges in the lower courts-for better or
worse--will find it increasingly difficult to do what they would really like to do
with the defendants who come before them.
More generally, what is threatened is the quality of judicial independence,
long revered as the hallmark of American justice.

The Constitution's idea of

separation of powers seems, with little doubt, violated by pressures upon the courts
from legislative sources to raise more money and from executive sources to forego
the professional, technical, and support staff needed to implement alternative
sentencing options. Most judges in these courts believed this, as did some-but not
all--other court participants.

On the other hand, there may be only a fine line

between judicial independence and judicial hegemony.

Political theorists and

commentators (Abraham, 1981) continue to argue that the legislature's "power of
the purse" is one of its few effective checks against a wild or overbearing
judiciary. Whether the courts should be treated at budget time like every other
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agency or in a special category reflective of their status as a separate branch of
government is a question being hotly debated in local communities these days. The
lack of consensus on this issue among policy-makers only parallels the lack of
consensus in the polity at large.

Implications for Research
Our findings and conclusions have implications for several bodies of research.
For sentencing research, we would suggest a closer look at the variables comprising
standard quantitative analyses. The research reported here strongly indicates that
contextual factors qualify or alter the mea1 .i!'lg of variables.
true with .respect to sanctions.
.

This is particularly

For example, fines have typically been used to

connote the economic penalty imposed upon convicted defendants.

But we have

found the increasing import of court costs, especially in Tacoma where they are
often being used in lieu of fines.

The meaning of probation is also changing, as

departments move increasingly to unsupervised probation in the wake of personnel
cutbacks.

Jail terms, too, become ambiguous when there is no certainty, as in

Tacoma, that they can or wi,ll be executed. These are but a few of many examples
that emerge from our comparative field-based research. · For every effort we made
to insure comparability from site to site in the meaning of key variables, we found
disturbing loose ends that could not readily be tied together. Future research, even
case-studies, should pay closer attention to what sentencing and related variables
actually mean.

In particular, qualitative methods should be used to supplement

quantitative analyses wherever possible (see also Feeley, 1979; Mather, 1979).
Much research has taken place during the past decade on the influence of
legal versus extra-legal factors on sentencing.

Those interested in extra-legal

influences have examined such offender characteristics as age, race, gender, and
socio-economic status to determine whether disparities in treatment existed
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between classes of defendants.

The research in this area has yielded some

important findings, but not without much methodological debate (Spohn et al.,
1981). Thus, we think that some resources should be redirected toward the study of
macro-level influences. Our research indicates that cross-community variations in
sentencing are not well-explained either by differences in legal factors such as the
type or seriousness of offense or differences in the demographic backgrounds of
defendants. Rather, sentencing variations are responsive to environmental conditions. The economy is but one of several possible areas of research, and ours is but
a first look at economic factors. The potential for theoretical contributions to our
understanding of justice seems much greater, at this point in time, by moving
systematic empirical inquiry beyond the courtroom.
Finally, our research may speak in a limited way to the community/political
culture literatures of sociology and political science. Communities may not be so
distinctive in their political cultures--in their values and attitudes about politics
and public policies (like crime)--as previously supposed. It has been commonplace
to attribute unexplained or peculiar differences in sentencing to the--usually
unknown--normative climates of communities (see, e.g., Levin, 1977; Wheeler et
al., 1982). But our research points, in a preliminary way, to consensual attitudes
about crime and punishment across four communities quite disparate in their
demography and geography. Attitudes about drunk driving, shoplifting, assault, and
speeding are almost invariant from one community to another.

Policy Implications
Our research also has a range of policy implications.

Rather than making

specific policy recommendations about the operation of the lower criminal courts,
we instead map out implications for several not-so-obvious policy areas.
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The first concerns research and implementation of sentencing guidelines. In
an effort to reduce wide judicial differences in sentencing at the felony level,
formal quantitative guidelines were developed, tested, and implemented in several
federal district courts (see Kress, 1980).

The purpose of the guidelines was to

establish a precise range of acceptable sentences for different categories of
offenders and offenses. The sentences were developed from penological considerations--rehabilitation, punishment and deterrence in some combination. Likewise,
some states have recently begun to develop and implement guidelines for their
felony, and occasionally, lower courts (see Criminal Courts Technical Assistance
Project, 1980). Guidelmes serve a useful purpose in the sentencing process, even if
their use is only voluntary or selective. But such guidelines will need to become
increasingly sensitive to the implications of "economic realities," if they are to be
at all realistic. Judges do not sentence defendants to jail or prison merely, as one
put it, to "hear their vocal cords operate." Resource availability at the state and
local levels will have to be factored into the equations that develop what kinds and
how much of sentences will be imposed.

In particular, input from sheriffs and

corrections officials will be essential.
A second area of policy implications focuses on the methods for court
financing. As a response to reform pressures for the unification of state courts,
local financing of courts has been urged to give way to state-level financing (see,
e.g., Berkson and Carbon, 1978). Baar (1975:116-17) observed a small trend toward
increased state financing of courts in the early 1970s.

What would be the

implications for political and economic considerations, if such a trend were to
contlnue or accelerate?
Many reformers regard locally-financed courts akin to political cesspools in
which judicial independence is severely compromised.

Shifting the budgetary

battleground to the state level, however, would seem to do little more than shift
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the arena--but not particularly the amount or intensity--of politics. In fact, we
know sufficiently little about these political processes that only sheer speculation
is possible.

But we do know that state financing is no panacea for the woes of

interest group pluralism or the complexities of federalism.

Local county board

members would lose control not only of expenditures (which they might gladly
yield) but also of revenue. As one consequence, locales whose courts are effective
at revenue-generating might find themselves helping to fund poor counties in other
parts of their state, if some kind of per capita factor were to prevail in the state
I

allocation process. Indeed, the uncertainties of interest group politics at the state
level are such that substantial resistance to state financing can be expected. Thus,
local politics will continue to flourish in most states, where courts remain
primarily financed from local treasuries.

Concluding Note
Our study of sentencing in four lower criminal courts accomplishes several
important goals. It is the first comparative study of -what can accurately be called
"America's most neglected courts" (President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, 1967).

The four courts we studied are quite

different in many aspects of their sentencing practices.

These differences--

identified in some detail--indicate the value of multi-site studies and, thus, the
limitations of case studies. Another key goal was to expand the object of analysis
beyond the confines of the courtroom or the courthouse •. We examine community
influences--both political and economic--on the aggregate sentencing features of
each court. Yet more remains to be done. Much of our research was necessarily
exploratory and limited.

We hope to lay some groundwork for future studies of

lower criminal courts and to provide alternative directions for analyses of the
adjudication and sentencing processes.
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